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W v Registrar of Marriages and the Right to 
Equality in Hong Kong
?
Kelley Loper*
This article contends that the Hong Kong government’s decision to deny 
a transgender woman’s application to marry her male partner, reviewed by 
the Court of First Instance in W v Registrar of Marriages, engages a right to 
equality and non-discrimination in Hong Kong constitutional law as well as 
anti-discrimination legislation. In light of the relative marginalization of the 
transgender community and Hong Kong’s reasonably robust equality jurispru-
dence, framing W’s challenge more explicitly on equality grounds may have 
had some advantages. In particular, a focus on equality may have strengthened 
the court’s resolve to exercise its duty to protect the rights of minorities against 
discriminatory social attitudes.
Introduction
In W v Registrar of Marriages (W),1 the Hong Kong Court of First Instance 
considered, among other issues, the constitutionality of the government’s 
refusal to allow the applicant, a post-operative transgender woman, to 
marry her male partner. The Registrar of Marriages based his decision on 
a narrow interpretation of the meaning of the term “woman” in the Mar-
riage Ordinance which excluded a transgender woman from its ambit.2 
Although counsel for the applicant essentially limited the constitutional 
limb of his argument to whether this decision violated her right to mar-
riage or privacy under the Basic Law, the Hong Kong Bill of Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), this 
article contends that W’s inability to marry also engages her right to 
equality and non-discrimination. In light of the relative marginaliza-
tion of the transgender community in Hong Kong and Hong Kong’s 
* Assistant Professor, Director of the LLM in Human Rights Programme, Deputy Director of the 
Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. The author 
would like to thank Denis Chang SC, Holning Lau, Carole J Petersen, and Po Jen Yap for their 
helpful comments. 
1 [2010] 6 HKC 359.
2 (Cap 181). According to s 40, the Ordinance governs a Christian marriage or the civil equiva-
lent which implies a “formal ceremony recognized by the law as involving the voluntary union 
for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others”. 
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reasonably robust equality jurisprudence, framing W’s challenge more 
explicitly on equality grounds may have had some advantages.
This article begins with a discussion of the content of a right to equal-
ity in Hong Kong law which has been infl uenced by international human 
rights standards and interpretive materials produced by the United 
Nations human rights treaty monitoring bodies (treaty bodies).3 It 
examines the tests developed by the courts for determining whether 
a distinction amounts to unconstitutional discrimination and the rel-
evance of certain “grounds” of discrimination, including gender identity, 
gender, and disability all of which are implied within the non-exhaustive 
list of protected characteristics in Arts 1 and 22 of the Hong Kong Bill 
of Rights.4 It then applies these standards to W’s case and argues that the 
decision to prevent her from marrying her boyfriend is an unjustifi able 
distinction which constitutes discrimination on one or more of these 
grounds.
While the right to marriage alone provides a solid foundation for W’s 
constitutional challenge5 a more explicit assertion of her right to equality 
and non-discrimination may have strengthened her claim. Hong Kong 
courts have carefully scrutinized justifi cations for distinctions which are 
based on grounds that go to the core of a person’s identity and dignity 
as a human being and a person’s “gender identity” would certainly fall 
within this category. In addition, since the right to equality requires the 
realization of substantive as well as formal equality, the courts must assess 
the degree of disadvantage faced by a particular group when considering 
whether discriminatory treatment has occurred. Omitting a transgender 
woman from the defi nition of “woman” for the purposes of marriage argu-
ably has the effect of targeting members of a marginalized group and may 
therefore be diffi cult to justify. An equality approach emphasizes that such 
an interpretation should not be conducted according to discriminatory 
values, even if such values are espoused by the majority in Hong Kong 
3 Hong Kong courts have generally been willing to consider international human rights jurispru-
dence, including these types of extrinsic materials, when deliberating human rights cases under 
the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. See R v Sin Yau Ming [1992] 1 HKCLR 127. For further discussion, 
see for example Carole J. Petersen, “Embracing Universal Standards? The Role of International 
Human Rights Treaties in Hong Kong’s Constitutional Jurisprudence”, in Hualing Fu, Lison 
Harris, & Simon N.M. Young (eds), Interpreting Hong Kong’s Basic Law: The Struggle for Coher-
ence, 33–53 (Palgrave MacMillan, 2007); Anthony Mason, “The Place of Comparative Law in 
Developing the Jurisprudence on the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Hong Kong”, (2007) 37 
HKLJ 299; and Johannes M.M. Chan, “Hong Kong’s Bill of Rights: Its Reception of and Contri-
bution to International and Comparative Jurisprudence”, (1998) 47 Int’l Comp. L. Q. 306.
4 The Hong Kong Bill of Rights is set out in s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance 
(Cap 383). These provisions essentially duplicate Arts 2(1), 3 and 26 of the ICCPR.
5 Despite the negative decision by the Court of First Instance, these arguments may succeed on 
appeal. See discussion of various weaknesses in the judgment by other contributors to this issue 
of HKLJ.
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society. A key tenet of the rule of law as it is understood and observed in 
Hong Kong is that the courts, when exercising their constitutional juris-
diction, have a duty to protect the rights of minorities against discrimina-
tory treatment. A focus on equality in W may have reinforced and drawn 
the court’s attention more resolutely toward its role in this regard.
Signifi cantly, establishing whether the government’s decision in 
relation to W amounted to a violation of her right to equality does not 
require a consideration of whether the relevant provisions in the Mar-
riage Ordinance themselves contravene the right to equality. Instead it 
entails a determination of whether the decision maker applied the provi-
sions as they are presently drafted in a discriminatory manner. Although 
the court in W seemed at times to incorrectly confl ate the issues of 
“same-sex” marriage and transgender marriage, the facts of the case do 
not support a claim of sexual orientation discrimination or a right to 
same-sex marriage.6 A challenge by W argued on equality grounds could 
succeed without the need to decide on the constitutionality of the text 
of the Marriage Ordinance.
The right to equality in Hong Kong law and its application to W
Overview
Hong Kong courts have decided a number of equality cases under the 
Basic Law and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights as well as anti-discrimina-
tion statutes such as the Sex Discrimination Ordinance (SDO)7 and the 
Disability Discrimination Ordinance (DDO).8 The content of a right to 
equality – while still developing – is generally more settled than the right 
to marriage which was at the centre of the court’s analysis in W.9 The 
courts have construed the right to “equality before the law”, expressed 
in Arts 25 of the Basic Law, with reference to the more extensive lan-
guage of Arts 1 and 22 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights which duplicate 
6 The Marriage Ordinance – which restricts the defi nition of marriage to a union between one man 
and one woman – arguably contravenes the equality guarantee because it discriminates on the 
basis of sexual orientation (i.e. a gay man cannot marry the partner of his choice because of his 
sexual orientation or sex). This question was not at issue in W. See Karen Lee Man Yee, “W v 
Registrar of Marriages: From Transsexual Marriage to Same-sex Marriage?” (2010) 40 HKLJ 549.
7 (Cap 480). 
8 (Cap 487).
9 According to the judgment, W also advanced arguments based on a right to privacy but ulti-
mately focused on the right to marry, an approach the court believed was appropriate. Cheung J 
decided that “[t]he applicant’s argument will stand or fall with the Court’s determination on the 
right to marry. Nothing will be gained by a separate consideration of the right to privacy under 
Art 14 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights”. See n 1 above, para 167.
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Arts 2(1), 3 and 26 of the ICCPR.10 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires 
states to “respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status”. Article 3 emphasizes the equal rights of men and women 
and Art 26 provides for a freestanding guarantee of equality before the 
law, equal protection of the law, and non-discrimination. It mandates 
that “the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all per-
sons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status”.
In interpreting these provisions, Hong Kong courts have begun to clarify 
certain principles which apply when ascertaining the constitutionality of 
potentially discriminatory treatment. First, the Court of Final Appeal has 
declared that equality is “the antithesis of discrimination” and “[t]he right 
to equality is in essence the right not to be discriminated against”.11 It has 
affi rmed the importance and fundamental nature of equality, citing its wide-
spread embodiment in national constitutions – including Hong Kong’s – and 
in international human rights instruments. Li CJ (as he then was) emphasized 
that “[d]iscriminatory law is unfair and violates the human dignity of those 
discriminated against. It is demeaning for them and generates ill-will and a 
sense of grievance on their part. It breeds tension and discord in society”.12 
The courts have also elaborated a test based on international stan-
dards and comparative human rights case law to establish whether cer-
tain distinctions are justifi able and therefore not discriminatory.13 In 
addition, they have proposed theories for determining when the courts 
must intently scrutinize justifi cations for differential treatment and sug-
gested that the rigor of analysis in this regard should depend in part on 
the nature of the “ground” on which the distinction has been made 
and whether the matter falls within the sphere of social and economic 
policy.14 Although this approach is controversial – especially the courts’ 
10 Article 39 of the Basic Law incorporates the ICCPR into Hong Kong law, effectively giving the 
Hong Kong Bill of Rights constitutional status.
11 Secretary for Justice v Yau Yuk Lung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 335.
12 Ibid. para 2.
13 Ibid.
14 See, for example, Yao Man Fai George v Director Social Welfare (unrep., HCAL 69/2009, [2010] 
HKEC 968); Kong Yun Ming v Director of Social Welfare [2009] 4 HKLRD 382; Fok Chun Wa v 
Hospital Authority (unrep., HCAL 94/2007, [2008] HKEC 2161) (CFI); Fok Chun Wa v Hospital 
Authority (unrep., CACV 30/2009, [2010] HKEC 713) (CA); Raza v Chief Executive-in-Council 
[2005] 3 HKLRD 561, para 118. The applicants have challenged the court’s approaches to the cat-
egorization of grounds as well as economic and social rights on appeal in some of these cases. The 
doctrine may therefore be modifi ed as the relevant cases work their way up the judicial hierarchy.
07-HKLJ-Loper-Ch-07.indd   92 5/23/2011   10:39:33 AM
Vol 41 Part 1 W v Registrar of Marriages and the Right to Equality 93
preferred categorization of “grounds” and its general unwillingness to 
deliberate claims involving social and economic rights – it is clear from 
the Hong Kong jurisprudence to date that any justifi cation for a distinc-
tion based on a characteristic as fundamental as transgender identity 
must be carefully examined.15
Prohibited grounds of discrimination
The fi rst stage when deciding whether a breach of the equality guaran-
tee has occurred – before considering the justifi ability test – is to ascer-
tain whether a distinction or classifi cation has been made. In addition, a 
determination of whether such a distinction amounts to unconstitutional 
discrimination depends, in part, on whether the differential treatment 
occurred on the basis of an invidious characteristic. In other words, the 
courts have recognized that the nature of the “ground” in question has a 
bearing on any assessment of the justifi ability of a distinction based on 
that ground. The grounds listed in the ICCPR and the Hong Kong Bill 
of Rights, and those which can be read into the list by way of analogy, are 
fundamental characteristics which go to the heart of a person’s identity. 
Any discrimination on such a ground would impinge on an individual’s 
dignity and enjoyment of human rights.
In Yau Yuk Lung, the Court of Final Appeal indicated that differen-
tiation on certain grounds may be more diffi cult to justify and therefore 
more likely to violate equality. Li CJ held that in cases where the differ-
ential treatment is “based on grounds such as race, sex or sexual orienta-
tion, the court will scrutinize with intensity whether the difference in 
treatment is justifi ed”.16 He also stated that minority status is relevant: 
“Homosexuals constitute a minority in the community. The provision [in 
the Crimes Ordinance] has the effect of targeting them and is constitu-
tionally invalid. The courts have the duty of enforcing the constitutional 
guarantee of equality before the law and of ensuring protection against 
discriminatory law”.17 
15 For discussion of the Hong Kong courts’ approach to their role vis-à-vis executive and legislative 
decision makers when adjudicating human rights claims, see the contributions by Holning Lau 
and Derek Loh, “Misapplication of ECHR Jurisprudence in W v Registrar of Marriages” (2011) 
41 HKLJ 75–87 (arguing that the court in W misapplied the “margin of appreciation” doctrine 
borrowed from the European Court of Human Rights when deferring to societal consensus) and 
Cora Chan, “Deference and the Separation of Powers: An Assessment of the Court’s Constitu-
tional and Institutional Competencies” (2011) 41 HKLJ 7–25.
16 See n 11 above, at para 21, per Li CJ citing Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 at 
p 568G (Lord Nicholls).
17 Ibid., para 29.
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In Kong Yunming,18 the claimant, a recent immigrant from mainland 
China whose husband (a Hong Kong permanent resident) died shortly 
after her arrival in Hong Kong, challenged the requirement that a per-
son must have resided in Hong Kong for seven years before qualifying 
for Comprehensive Social Security Assistance. She argued that the resi-
dency rule was discriminatory because it distinguished on the basis of 
residency status.19 In its analysis of the equality guarantee, the Court of 
First Instance cited R (Carson) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
in which Lord Hoffmann made a distinction between two different cate-
gories of grounds:20 the fi rst includes race, caste, noble birth, membership 
in a political party and gender; while the second includes ability, educa-
tion, wealth and occupation.21 He distinguished between the two catego-
ries stating that discrimination on “category one” grounds would “prima 
facie appear to offend our notions of the respect due to the individual” 
whereas distinctions on “category two” grounds may “merely require 
some rational justifi cation”.22 He explained that differential treatment 
on a fi rst category ground would be diffi cult to justify but that whether a 
distinction made on a second category ground could be justifi ed would 
“usually depend upon consideration of the general public interest.”23 He 
explained that the “grounds that would probably fall within the fi rst cat-
egory are matters that go to the very make up or identity of the person 
in question as an individual; something that is basic, essential or funda-
mental to him/her and that goes to the core of his/her being as a human 
being; something that defi nes the person physically or intrinsically.”24
There are three potentially relevant “grounds” – all of which would 
fall within Lord Hoffmann’s fi rst category – on which W could claim she 
18 See n 14 above.
19 The author has argued elsewhere that this case involved other grounds such as sex, gender or 
national origin since the policy has had an adverse, disproportionate impact on new immigrant 
women from mainland China married to Hong Kong permanent residents. See Kelley Loper 
“Constitutional Adjudication and Substantive Gender Equality in Hong Kong”, in Beverly 
Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez, and Tsvi Kahana (eds), Feminist Constitutionalism: Global Perspec-
tives (Cambridge University Press, 2011, forthcoming). The court also arguably misapplied the 
categorization test and failed to consider the implications of residency status on a person’s dig-
nity and ability to exercise fundamental rights. It therefore inappropriately dismissed the claim 
by classifying the ground within “category two”. It would be more appropriate and consistent 
with Hong Kong law for the courts to apply strict scrutiny to justifi cations on the basis of any of 
the grounds – or a combination of the grounds – listed in the ICCPR including “other status” 
as interpreted by the treaty bodies.
20 Ibid., paras 74–75 (citing R (Carson) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 AC 173 
[Carson], paras 14–17).
21 Ibid., para 74 (citing Carson at para 15).
22 Ibid., citing Carson, para 15 per Lord Hoffmann, citing Massachusettes Board of Retirement v 
Murgia 427 US 307 (1976).
23 Ibid., para 75 (citing Carson at para 16).
24 Ibid., para 79.
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experienced discriminatory treatment and which are recognized as pro-
tected characteristics under the ICCPR’s equality provisions and there-
fore under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. These include gender identity 
or transgender identity, sex or gender, and disability. Discrimination on 
two of these grounds, sex and disability, are also prohibited by specifi c 
anti-discrimination legislation in Hong Kong: the SDO and DDO.
Gender identity or transgender status
The ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cul-
tural Rights (ICESCR) contain the same open-ended list of “grounds” on 
which discrimination is prohibited. The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights – the treaty body which monitors states’ implementa-
tion of their obligations under the ICESCR – recognizes that gender iden-
tity is a prohibited ground of discrimination falling within the category of 
“other status”.25 This approach is consistent with a legal model aimed at 
securing substantive or de facto equality for marginalized groups. Members 
of transgender communities in many societies face formal as well as systemic 
discrimination and severe harassment based on their transgender status.26 
Gender identity is a characteristic which cannot be changed, or which an 
individual should not be required to change and discrimination on that 
basis directly implicates human dignity and the enjoyment of human rights. 
The Yogyakarta Principles, a non-binding but infl uential document 
which refl ects the consensus of twenty-nine experts as to the “existing 
state of international human rights law in relation to issues of sexual 
orientation and gender identity”, affi rms that “[e]veryone is entitled to 
enjoy all human rights without discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity” and to “equality before the law and the 
equal protection of the law without any such discrimination whether or 
25 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20, Non-
discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art 2, para 2), E/C.12/GC/20, 10 June 
2009, para 32.
26 See, for example, Mark E. King, “Transprejudice in Hong Kong: Chinese Attitudes Toward 
Transgenderism and Transgender Civil Rights”, Doctoral Thesis, The University of Hong 
Kong, 2008, available at: http://hub.hku.hk/handle/10722/51070; Sam J. Winter, Beverley J. 
Webster, and Pui Kei Eleanor Cheung, “Measuring Hong Kong Undergraduate Students’ Atti-
tudes Towards Transpeople”, (2008) 59 Sex Roles 670; Mark E. King, Sam J. Winter, Beverley J. 
Webster, “Contact Reduces Transprejudice: A Study on Attitudes towards Transgenderism and 
Transgender Civil Rights in Hong Kong”, (2009) 21 International Journal of Sexual Health 17; 
and Robyn Emerton, “Finding a Voice, Fighting for Rights: The Emergence of the Transgender 
Movement in Hong Kong”, (2006) 7 Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 243. For a discussion of the 
extent of prejudice and discrimination against transgendered persons in Asia, see Sam Winter, 
“Lost in Translation: Transpeople, Transprejudice, and Pathology in Asia”, (2009) 13 The Inter-
national Journal of Human Rights 365.
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not the enjoyment of another human right is also affected”.27 The Prin-
ciples clarify that “[t]he law shall prohibit any such discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against any such 
discrimination”. They defi ne discrimination, which includes both formal 
and substantive inequalities, as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference based on sexual orientation or gender identity which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality before the law or the 
equal protection of the law, or the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on 
an equal basis, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”28
There is also growing consensus in common law countries that dis-
crimination on the grounds of gender identity is analogous to discrimina-
tion on other grounds which also manifest a characteristic fundamental 
to a person’s identity. Some countries have enacted laws which explicitly 
include gender identity as a prohibited ground of discrimination.29 
Outside the constitutional context, the courts have relied on par-
ticular doctrines to determine whether an act amounts to direct dis-
crimination according to the defi nition in Hong Kong’s anti-discrim-
ination statutes. A plaintiff must demonstrate that she was treated 
less favourably in an area which falls within the scope of the legisla-
tion, such as employment or education, on a prohibited ground than 
a similarly situated comparator who does not have the relevant status 
or has a different status. The relevant question is whether the plaintiff 
would have been treated in the same manner as a real or hypothetical 
comparator “but for” the plaintiff ’s status (defi ned by the prohibited 
ground).30
Although there is no specifi c anti-discrimination legislation that 
prohibits gender identity discrimination, applying the “but for” test to 
27 Yogyakarta Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to 
sexual orientation and gender identity, March 2007, Principle 2, available at: http://www.
yogyakartaprinciples.org/ (last viewed, 6 March 2011).
28 Ibid.
29 For example, the UK Gender Recognition Act (2004) and Equality Act (2010). The Equal-
ity Act protects from discrimination on the grounds of “gender reassignment”. According to 
Part II, s 7 of the Act, “A person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if the 
person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) 
for the purpose of reassigning the person’s sex by changing physiological or other attributes of 
sex.”
30 See Secretary for Justice v Chan Wah (2000) 3 HKCFAR 459. In some cases, the courts appear 
to confl ate the constitutional right to equality with the prohibition of discrimination under 
the anti-discrimination statutes, although the tests are different and the statutes do not allow 
for justifi cation of direct discrimination unless there is a specifi c, applicable exception. See, 
for example, Equal Opportunities Commission v Director of Education [2001] 2 HKLRD 690. The 
statutes overlap with the constitutional provisions, however, since the prohibited grounds in 
the legislation would also be covered by the constitutional guarantees and because the SDO 
and DDO prohibit the government from discriminating in the performance of its functions and 
exercise of its powers. See SDO ss 21 and 38 and DDO ss 21 and 36. 
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the decision to prohibit W from marrying is a useful tool that dem-
onstrates that even within the strict confi nes of a statutory defi nition 
of discrimination (which is narrower than the broader constitutional 
provisions),31 the decision would likely amount to unfavourable treat-
ment based on W’s transgender status. Applying the “but for” test and 
a comparator analysis it seems clear that W was treated less favourably 
than a woman without transgender identity would have been treated in 
a similar situation: i.e. when attempting to marry a man. In other words, 
she would have been treated the same as a non-transgender woman who 
had wanted to marry her male partner “but for” her gender identity or 
transgender status.
Sex and gender 
Some jurisdictions have accepted that discrimination against trans-
gendered persons is a form of gender or sex discrimination32 and inter-
national human rights treaty bodies have recognized the intersection 
between sex, gender and gender identity when interpreting the equality 
and non-discrimination provisions in key human rights instruments. The 
Hong Kong government’s decision not to recognize the acquired gender 
of a post-operative, transsexual woman for the purposes of marriage is 
arguably rooted in discriminatory attitudes and stereotypes about gen-
der and the nature of femininity and masculinity. Indeed, a decision to 
exclude a transgender woman from the defi nition of “woman” in Hong 
Kong law refl ects discriminatory societal attitudes about what it means to 
be a “man” or a “woman” and may fall foul of the prohibition against sex 
or gender discrimination. This reading is consistent with Hong Kong’s 
obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
31 The defi nition of direct discrimination in the anti-discrimination legislation – which is the 
same across all four statutes – does not allow for justifi cation of unfavourable treatment based 
on a prohibited ground, unless the statute contains a specifi c exception which would apply in 
the particular case.
32 For example, in Schroer v Billington 577 E Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D.D.C. 2008) a US Federal Court 
held that the Library of Congress unlawfully discriminated on the basis of sex – construed to 
include gender – by rescinding an offer of employment to Schroer, a transgendered woman, 
after she informed them that she would be transitioning to her acquired gender at the time 
she took up the position. The court recognized that the employer’s decision amounted to sex 
discrimination against Schroer because she failed to conform to gender stereotypes. The court 
held that “[s]ex stereotyping based on a person’s gender nonconforming behavior is impermis-
sible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior”. See also P v S and Cornwall 
County Council [1996] IRLR 347, a decision of the European Court of Justice, and discussion of 
this case in Robyn Emerton, “Time for Change: A Call for the Legal Recognition of Transsexual 
and Other Transgender Persons in Hong Kong” (2004) 34 HKLJ 515.
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Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and Hong Kong case law 
under the SDO which refers to provisions in CEDAW.33
The Convention’s monitoring body notes that the term “gender” 
“refers to socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women 
and men and society’s social and cultural meaning for these biological 
differences resulting in hierarchical relationships between women and 
men …”34 The Committee has commented on the impact of traditional 
stereotypes about the role of women and men in society on the rights 
of transgendered persons. For example, in its concluding comments on 
Panama’s state report in February 2010, it expressed grave concern “that 
certain groups of women, in addition to being affected by gender ste-
reotypes, face multiple forms of discrimination as well as violence on 
grounds such as sexual orientation and gender identity.”35
Similarly, in his 2009 report, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while counter-
ing terrorism observed that “gender is not synonymous with women but 
rather encompasses the social constructions that underlie how women’s 
and men’s roles, functions and responsibilities, including in relation to 
sexual orientation and gender identity are defi ned and understood.”36
Disability
The treatment of W could also potentially amount to “disability dis-
crimination” as understood in the DDO.37 Disability is defi ned broadly 
and includes a variety of physical and mental conditions such as “the 
total or partial loss of a part of the person’s body” and “a disorder, ill-
ness or disease that affects a person’s thought processes, perception of 
33 See Equal Opportunities Commission v Director of Education (n 30 above), Hartmann J held that 
“the words of the [SDO] are to be construed, if they are reasonably capable of bearing such a 
meaning, as intended to carry out the obligations contained in CEDAW rather than being 
inconsistent with them.”
34 CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under 
Art 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2, 19 Oct 2010, para 5.
35 CEDAW/C/PAN/CO/7, para 22.
36 A/64/211, 3 August 2009, para 52.
37 See DDO Cap 487, s 6. Disability also falls within the category of “other status” in Arts 2(1) 
and 26 of the ICCPR and thus W could have also argued that the Registrar of Marriages’ deci-
sion to deny her application to marry contravened her constitutional right to equality. See 
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, n 25 above, at para 28. For a persuasive 
argument for the increased use of disability nondiscrimination laws in the United States to pro-
tect transgender people from discrimination see Jennifer L. Levi and Bennett H. Klein, “Pursu-
ing Protection for Transgender People through Disability Laws”, in Paisley Currah, Richard M. 
Juang, and Shannon Price Minter, (eds), Transgender Rights (University of Minnesota Press, 
2006). See also Emerton n 32 above.
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reality, emotions or judgment or that results in disturbed behavior”.38 
Controversially, many transpeople have been diagnosed with “diseases”, 
such as “gender identity disorder” or “gender dysphoria”, which would 
fall within this defi nition of disability allowing them to challenge dis-
criminatory conduct on that basis.39 Some have resisted attempts to label 
transgender identity as a medical ailment and argue that reliance on the 
DDO’s defi nition may serve to reinforce rather than alleviate prejudice 
against members of the transgender community. Instead the preference is 
to comprehend transgender as a natural part of human diversity.40
More recent conceptions of disability may serve to mitigate such con-
cerns, however. Indeed, the disability rights movement has advanced the 
discourse on disability beyond a model that defi nes disability strictly as 
a medical condition with a focus on the limitations of the individual. It 
has instead moved toward acceptance of a social model that understands 
disability as a function of the environment. In other words, disability 
arises from society and is not inherent in the individual. Persons with 
disabilities are not “burdens” or “ill” – on the contrary, their increasing 
visibility adds to human diversity in a positive way and therefore under-
cuts the stigma attached to the term. Since the adoption in 2006 and 
the subsequent wide ratifi cation of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, this social or human rights model of dis-
ability has eclipsed the medical model. For example, the preamble of 
the Convention acknowledges that disability is an evolving concept that 
“results from the interaction between persons with impairments and atti-
tudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others.” The defi nition 
of disability in the DDO refl ects this approach to some extent since it 
also includes a disability that is “imputed” to a person in addition to 
a list of impairments and medical conditions.41 If the courts interpret 
the Hong Kong DDO and/or the constitutional guarantee of disability 
equality in accordance with this human rights paradigm, the transgender 
community may be willing to conceptualize transgender discrimination 
38 DDO (n 8 above) s 2.
39 In 2001, Jessica Park, a transgender woman who was excommunicated from the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Hong Kong, attempted to rely on the DDO to argue that 
the church had unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of her disability. See Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints Hong Kong Ltd v Stewart JC Park (unrep., HCA 1167/2001, 
[2 001] HKCU 1100) and Sara Bradford, “Sex-change Mormon Sues Church”, South China 
Morning Post, 16 March 2001. 
40 See King, n 26 above. Article 23 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
provides for the right to respect for home and family, including marriage.
41 DDO (n 8 above) s 2. For a discussion of this concept, see K v Secretary for Justice [2000] 3 
HKLRD 777.
07-HKLJ-Loper-Ch-07.indd   99 5/23/2011   10:39:33 AM
100 Kelley Loper (2011) HKLJ
claims as disability claims, especially in the absence of a gender identity 
discrimination statute.42
Justifi cation of distinctions and substantive equality
Once a distinction on a prohibited ground has been identifi ed – and it 
is clear that W was treated differently on the basis of one or more of the 
grounds discussed above – the next step is to consider whether such a 
distinction is justifi able and therefore not discriminatory.
In developing the justifi cation test, the courts have favourably cited 
the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on non-discrimina-
tion in which the Committee observes that “not every differentiation of 
treatment will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differen-
tiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a pur-
pose which is legitimate under the [ICCPR]”.43 In an early equality case, 
Bokhary J (as he then was) referred to this passage and acknowledged 
that “[c]learly, there is no requirement of literal equality in the sense of 
unrelentingly identical treatment always. For such rigidity would subvert 
rather than promote true even-handedness. So that, in certain circum-
stances, a departure from literal equality would be a legitimate course 
and, indeed, the only legitimate course.”44 At the same time, however, 
“the starting point is identical treatment. And any departure therefrom 
must be justifi ed.”45 To justify a distinction, “it must be shown: one, that 
sensible and fair-minded people would recognize a genuine need for some 
difference of treatment; two, that the difference embodied in the particu-
lar departure selected to meet that need is itself rational; and, three, that 
such departure is proportionate to such need”.46
In Secretary for Justice v Yau Yuk Lung,47 Li CJ confi rmed the basic 
character of this test when considering whether certain provisions in the 
Crimes Ordinance amounted to discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation – which he accepted as a prohibited ground of discrimina-
tion within the meaning of “other status” in the ICCPR and the Bill 
of Rights. To satisfy the test, the difference in treatment must pursue a 
legitimate aim, must be rationally connected to that aim, and must be 
42 The author is grateful to Carole J Petersen for sharing her refl ections on this point.
43 Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination”, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/Add 1 (1989), para 13.
44 R v Man Wai Keung (No 2) [1992] 2 HKCLR 207, p 217.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 See n 11 above.
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no more than necessary to achieve the aim.48 He then explained that if 
distinctions can be justifi ed then they would not amount to unconstitu-
tional discrimination: “Where the difference in treatment satisfi es the 
justifi cation test, the correct approach is to regard the difference in treat-
ment as not constituting discrimination and not infringing the constitu-
tional right to equality”.49 In this sense, the justifi ability test as applied 
to equality and non-discrimination claims differs somewhat from similar 
tests used to ascertain the justifi ability of breaches – or limitations on the 
exercise – of other human rights. In other human rights cases, justifi ca-
tion often provides a means of balancing rights with competing interests 
or confl icting rights.50 In relation to equality, however, since a distinction 
does not amount to discrimination if it survives the test, the analysis does 
not involve fi rst deciding whether the right to non-discrimination has 
been violated and then justifying that violation. A right to non-discrim-
ination has been violated only if the distinction fails the justifi ability test.
This difference is signifi cant and not merely a matter of semantics. It 
signals recognition by the courts that the right to equality in Hong Kong 
law is not only formal but also substantive in nature since justifi able dis-
tinctions are consistent with – not regarded as exceptions to – the equal-
ity principle. In other words, a formal application of an equal treatment 
principle – treating like cases alike – is not suffi cient when determining 
the existence of discrimination. For example, distinctions or special mea-
sures aimed at benefi tting members of a particularly marginalized group 
but which seemingly violate formal equality could be justifi ed and there-
fore not discriminatory. In fact, they may be necessary to achieve de facto 
or substantive equality.
An understanding that the right to equality is underpinned by a sub-
stantive concept is consistent with international human rights standards 
and their interpretation by the Human Rights Committee and other 
treaty bodies. For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which oversees implementation of the ICESCR, inter-
prets the right to equality in Art 2(2), which essentially mirrors ICCPR 
Art 2(1), as a right to both formal and substantive equality:
The effective enjoyment of Covenant rights is often infl uenced by whether 
a person is a member of a group characterized by the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination. Eliminating discrimination in practice requires paying suf-
fi cient attention to groups of individuals which suffer historical or persistent 
48 Ibid., para 20.
49 Ibid., para 22.
50 See, for example, HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu (1999) 2 HKCFAR 442.
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prejudice instead of merely comparing the formal treatment of  individuals 
in similar situations. States parties must therefore immediately adopt the 
necessary measures to prevent, diminish and eliminate the conditions and 
attitudes which cause or perpetuate substantive or de facto discrimination.51
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
the treaty body which oversees CEDAW explains that: 
a purely formal legal or programmatic approach is not suffi cient to achieve 
women’s de facto equality with men, which the Committee interprets as sub-
stantive equality … The lives of women and men must be considered in 
a contextual way, and measures adopted towards a real transformation of 
opportunities, institutions and systems so that they are no longer grounded 
in historically determined male paradigms of power and life patterns.52
These passages and other relevant interpretive materials produced 
by the human rights treaty bodies53 clarify that substantive equality 
requires a deliberation of the actual situation of disadvantage including 
a group’s degree of marginalization and minority status. This approach 
is critical when establishing whether a seemingly formal violation of 
equality in fact amounts to unconstitutional discrimination or if it is 
a legitimate means of ensuring equality in a substantive sense. It also 
mandates careful scrutiny by the court of any justifi cation for a formal 
distinction which negatively impacts such a group. If the court applied 
such a contextual, substantive analysis when evaluating whether dif-
ferential treatment toward W is justifi able in relation to her ability to 
marry, it would need to take into account the reality of considerable 
past and ongoing discrimination against transpeople in Hong Kong.54 
Given this group’s relative disadvantage, it would be appropriate to 
carefully scrutinize any justifi cation for differential treatment, includ-
ing the relevance, if any, of an apparent lack of societal consensus 
regarding marriage.
51 Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, n 25 above, para 8.
52 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation 
No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Art 2 of [CEDAW], CEDAW/C/2010/47/
GC.2, 19 October 2010, paras 8 and 10. The Committee also clarifi es that “States parties are 
under an obligation to respect, protect and fulfi l the right to non-discrimination of women and 
to ensure the development and advancement of women in order to improve their position and 
implement their right of de jure and de facto or substantive equality with men” (para 16). See 
also paras 20 and 24.
53 See, for example, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recom-
mendation No. 32, The meaning and scope of special measures in the ICERD, August 2009.
54 See n 26 above. 
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If W were able to demonstrate that the decision to exclude a trans-
gender woman from the defi nition of woman is a distinction on a pro-
hibited ground – i.e. treating W differently because of her transgender 
status or on the basis of gender stereotypes or disability, as contended 
above – the onus would then be on the government to justify the dif-
ference in treatment according to the test outlined above. First, as men-
tioned, the court would be required to examine such justifi cations with a 
high degree of scrutiny in this context because of the existence of de facto 
discrimination faced by transgender people in Hong Kong as well as the 
fundamental nature of the applicable prohibited grounds (i.e. transgen-
der status, sex, gender, or disability). It would therefore be diffi cult – if 
not impossible – to justify any reasons put forward for an interpretation 
of the Marriage Ordinance which refl ect a discriminatory notion of the 
term “woman”.
For example, the Registrar of Marriages may have attempted to defend 
the decision to continue to interpret “woman” as exclusive of a trans-
gender woman by arguing that it serves the aim of preserving the tradi-
tional procreative function of marriage. The fi rst step would require the 
government to demonstrate that this purpose is legitimate. It may have 
maintained that the institution of marriage plays an important social 
role by providing the framework of a family unit in which to bear and 
raise children. This understanding of marriage, however, has changed – a 
fact acknowledged by Cheung J in W55 – and is arguably based on dis-
criminatory assumptions about the proper role of men and women within 
the family and society and stereotypes about gender and child rearing. 
Indeed, it may be that the presumed role of the woman within marriage 
has changed in part because of efforts to eliminate discrimination against 
women within families and society through legal measures in recent 
decades. 
CEDAW and its monitoring body recognize that such assumptions and 
stereotypes amount to – and perpetuate – discrimination against women 
both within the private realm as well as in society at large. Article 5 
therefore obligates states to take all appropriate measures:
(a)   To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men 
and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of preju-
dices and customary and all other practices which are based on 
55 See n 1 above para 130. Cheung J notes that “[i]n terms of the nature and purpose of mar-
riage, certainly the emphasis on procreation has shifted”. He cites Lord Nicholls’ observation 
in Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467 at para 46 that “‘[f]or a long time now the emphasis [of 
the purpose of marriage] has been different’ … Variously expressed, there is now much more 
emphasis on the ‘mutual society, help and comfort that the one ought to have of the other’ ”. 
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the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes 
or on stereotyped roles for men and women;
(b)  To ensure that family education includes a proper understand-
ing of maternity as a social function and the recognition of the 
common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing 
and development of their children, it being understood that the 
interest of the children is the primordial consideration in all 
cases.56
An understanding of marriage based on notions of the roles of women in 
marriage defi ned primarily according to their reproductive utility would 
thus contravene the Convention’s obligations.57
It is clear that such an aim cannot be legitimate if it is grounded on, 
or refl ects, discriminatory attitudes and assumptions58 even if these atti-
tudes are not recognized by the decision-maker and there is no inten-
tion to discriminate. Indeed such values are often so entrenched in social 
expectations that they may not be apparent to most people. It is diffi cult 
to conceive of any other purpose for continuing to interpret the word 
woman as excluding a transgender woman in the context of marriage 
which is not founded on a characterization of the role of women within 
the family as a producer of children. The government would therefore be 
unable to satisfy even the fi rst limb of the justifi cation test and it would 
not be necessary to consider the second and third steps.
Equality, societal consensus, and the role of the courts
Although W did not involve issues related to sexual orientation – she was 
a transsexual woman who wanted to marry a man – the court’s analysis of 
56 The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has noted that in the 
extreme, prejudiced and stereotypical notions about the roles of women in the family can even 
lead to violent practices against women which have been justifi ed “as a form of protection or 
control of women.” See General Recommendation No. 19, “Violence against Women”, 1992, 
para 11.
57 The Hong Kong Court of First Instance relied on Art 10 of CEDAW – which addresses stereo-
typed concepts of the roles of men and women in education – for interpretive guidance in Equal 
Opportunities Commission v Director of Education (n 30 above) at para 88 when determining that 
the secondary school placement allocation scheme discriminated against girls and breached the 
SDO. Hartmann J (as he then was) noted that “Article 10 of the Convention makes it plain 
that stereotyped concepts of both men and women are in themselves, if not discriminatory, 
at least the wellspring from which discrimination fl ows.” He added that the defi nition of dis-
crimination in the SDO “is not to be defl ected by broad assumptions … that categorise women 
according to stereotypes” at paras 90 and 91.
58 See the discussion of Cho Man Kit v Broadcasting Authority (unrep., HCAL 69/2007, [2008] 
HKEC 783) below.
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sexual orientation discrimination in Cho Man Kit v Broadcasting Author-
ity59 is especially instructive since it ponders the relevance of public opin-
ion as well as the role of the courts in protecting members of minority 
communities who are not generally accepted by society. It also further 
supports the argument presented above that any reasons put forward to 
justify decisions which restrict fundamental rights, such as the right to 
freedom of expression (and by analogy the right to marriage in W) can-
not be founded on discriminatory values. 
Cho Man Kit challenged the Broadcasting Authority’s (BA) conclu-
sion that the content of a documentary about the lives of two gay couples 
(“Gay Lovers”) which aired on Radio Television Hong Kong violated its 
Code of Practice. The court recognized that the BA’s decision “resulted 
in an impermissible restriction on the freedom of speech, a restriction 
founded materially on a discriminatory factor; namely homosexuality, as 
a form of sexual orientation, may be offensive to certain viewers”. In 
refl ecting on the relevance of public opinion the court acknowledged 
that “it is for the [BA], as the primary decision maker, to come to its 
determination for its own reasons, deciding for itself how best to weigh 
the various broad and often imprecise considerations that are contained 
in the prevailing code of practice”.60 Hartmann J favourably cited Lord 
Hoffmann’s opinion in R (Profi le Alliance) v BBC that it is proper for 
Parliament to resolve how broadcasts can be subject to taste and decency 
requirements and that “public opinion cannot be totally disregarded in 
the pursuit of liberty”.61 He ultimately held, however, that “public opin-
ion must be taken to be the opinion of reasonable members of the Hong 
Kong community, those who understand that in a democratic society 
a restriction of fundamental freedoms can never be justifi ed by a con-
sensus of opinion based on ‘prejudices, personal aversions and [dubious] 
rationalisations’”.62 He also cited a passage from Ronald Dworkin’s Taking 
Rights Seriously:
Even if it is true that most men think homosexuality an abominable vice 
and cannot tolerate its presence, it remains possible that this common opin-
ion is a compound of prejudice . . . rationalization . . . and personal aversion . . . 
It remains possible that the ordinary man could produce no reasons for his 
view, but would simply parrot his neighbor who in turn parrots him, or that 
he would produce a reason which presupposes a general moral position he 
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., para 65.
61 Ibid., para 65 citing R (Prolife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] 2 WLR 1403, 
p 1422 per Lord Hoffmann.
62 Ibid. para 66.
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could not sincerely or consistently claim to hold. If so, the principles of 
democracy we follow do not call for the enforcement of a consensus, for the 
belief that prejudices, personal aversions and rationalizations do not justify 
restricting another’s freedom, itself occupies a critical and fundamental posi-
tion in our popular morality.63 
By analogy, this reasoning could also apply to societal views related to 
transgender persons. Reinforcing an apparent societal consensus that 
transgender marriage is wrong based on prejudice, personal aversions, 
and gender stereotypes would similarly fall foul of the democratic prin-
ciples Dworkin espouses. In Cho Man Kit, an equality lens helped illumi-
nate the problems associated with relying on a societal consensus when 
the fundamental rights of minorities were at stake and underscored the 
court’s role in protecting disadvantaged groups from discrimination.64 
Such a lens – especially one based on a substantive equality principle – 
could also highlight the diffi culties and inappropriateness of deference to 
majority views in W.
Conclusion
This analysis of the potential applicability of a right to equality to W’s 
claim demonstrates that denying a transgender woman’s right to marry 
engages the right to equality in Hong Kong law as informed by interna-
tional human rights standards. A denial of equality was central to W’s 
experience and the essence of her claim involved the negative, discrimi-
natory impact that the decision by the Registrar of Marriages – which 
arguably refl ected discriminatory societal values and gender stereotypes – 
had on her dignity as a human being. 
Although equality was not at the forefront of W’s constitutional 
challenge, Cheung J alludes to the minority status of the transgender 
community, the importance of the rights associated with marriage, and 
the connection between gender identity, equality and human dignity. 
63 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, as cited at Ibid., para 66. Hartmann J acknowledged 
the Court of Appeal’s citation of the same passage in Secretary for Justice v Yau Yuk Lung [2006] 
4 HKLRD 196 (CFI), at 202.
64 In Leung v Secretary for Justice [2006] 4 HKLRD 211, para 53, Ma CJHC (as he then was) 
also refl ected on the role of the courts: “Where the court does not see any justifi cation for the 
alleged infringement of fundamental rights, it would be its duty to strike down unconstitutional 
laws, for while there must be deference to the Legislature as it represents the views of the major-
ity in a society, the court must also be acutely aware of its role which is to protect minorities 
from the excesses of the majority. In short, the court’s duty is to apply the law; in constitutional 
matters, it must apply the letter and spirit of the Basic Law and the Bill of Rights”.
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He acknowledges the argument that “allowing a post-operative trans-
sexual to marry in his or her newly acquired sex is of great signifi cance 
to the individual, as many other rights, interests and privileges as well 
as status in our society are dependent on the status of marriage. Still 
more importantly, it concerns the individual’s inherent human dignity, 
equality and respect”.65 Perhaps this passage could serve as the starting 
point for a more focused consideration of equality in W going forward 
and/or in other cases related to the rights of members of the transgender 
 community in Hong Kong.
65 See n 1 above, para 252. The author is grateful to Denis Chang, SC for pointing out this passage 
as the only direct mention of equality in the judgment.
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